Incentive Alignment of Business Processes: a game theoretic approach by Heindel, Tobias & Weber, Ingo
Incentive Alignment of Business Processes:
a game theoretic approach
Tobias Heindel[0000−0003−3371−8564] and Ingo Weber[0000−0002−4833−5921]
Chair of Software and Business Engineering, Technische Universitaet Berlin, Germany
{heindel,ingo.weber}@tu-berlin.de
Abstract. Many definitions of business processes refer to business goals, value
creation, or profits/gains of sorts. Nevertheless, the focus of formal methods
research on business processes, like the well-known soundness property, lies on
correctness with regards to execution semantics of modeling languages. Among
others, soundness requires proper completion of process instances. However, the
question of whether participants have any interest in working towards completion
(or in participating in the process) has not been addressed as of yet.
In this work, we investigate whether inter-organizational business processes give
participants incentives for achieving the common business goals – in short, whether
incentives are aligned with the process. In particular, fair behavior should pay off
and efficient completion of tasks should be rewarded. We propose a game-theoretic
approach that relies on algorithms for solving stochastic games from the machine
learning community. We describe a method for checking incentive alignment of
process models with utility annotations for tasks, which can be used for a priori
analysis of inter-organizational business processes. Last but not least, we show
that the soundness property corresponds to a special case of incentive alignment.
Keywords: incentive alignment · inter-organizational business processes · collab-
oration · choreography · soundness property
1 Introduction
Many definitions of business processes refer to business goals [29] or value creation [7],
but whether process participants are actually incentivized to contribute to a process
has not been addressed as yet. For intra-organizational processes, this question is less
relevant; motivation to contribute is often based on loyalty, bonuses if the organization
performs well, or simply that tasks in a process are part of one’s job. Instead, economic
modeling of intra-organizational processes often focuses on cost, e.g. in activity-based
costing [12], which can be assessed using model checking tools [9] or simulation [5].
For inter-organizational business processes, such indirect motivation cannot be as-
sumed. A prime example of misaligned incentives was the $2.5B write-off in Cisco’s
supply chain in April 2001 [20]: success of the overall supply chain was grossly mis-
aligned with the incentives of individual participants. (This happened although several
game theoretic approaches for analyzing incentive structures are available for the case
of supply chains [4].) Furthermore, modeling incentives accurately is actually possi-
ble in cross-organizational processes, e.g., based on contracts and agreed-upon prices.
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2 Tobias Heindel and Ingo Weber
Now, with the advent of blockchain technology [30], it is possible to execute cross-
organizational business processes or choreographies as smart contracts [18,28]. The
blockchain serves as a neutral, participant-independent computational infrastructure,
and as such enables collaboration across organizations even in situations characterized
by a lack of trust between participants [28]. However, as there is no central role for
oversight, it is important that incentives are properly designed in such situations, among
other reasons to avoid unintended –possibly devastating– results, like those encountered
by Cisco. In fact, a main goal of the Ethereum blockchain is, according to its founder
Vitalik Buterin, to create “a better world by aligning incentives”1.
In this paper, we present a principled framework for incentive alignment of inter-
organizational business processes. We consider bpmn models with suitable annotation
concerning the utility2 of activities, very much in the spirit of activity-based costing (abc)
[12, Chapter 5]. In short, fair behavior should pay off and participants should be rewarded
for efficient completion of process instances. In more detail, we shall consider bpmn
models as stochastic games [24] and formalize incentive alignment as “good” equilibria
of the resulting game. Which equilibria are the desirable ones depends on the business
goals w.r.t. which we want align incentives. In the present paper, we focus on proper
completion and liveness of activities. Interestingly, the soundness property [2] will be
rediscovered as the special case of incentive alignment within a single organization that
rewards completion of every activity.
The overall contribution of the paper is a framework for incentive alignment of
business process models, particularly in inter-organizational settings. Our approach is
based on game theory and inspired by advances on the solution of stochastic games
from the machine learning community, which has developed algorithms for the practical
computation of Nash [22] and correlated equilibria [16,17]. The framework focuses on
checking incentive alignment as an a priori analysis of business processes specified as
bpmn models with activity-based utility annotations. Specifically, we:
1. describe a principled method for translating bpmn-models with activity-based costs
to stochastic games [24]
2. propose a notion of incentive alignment that we prove to be a conservative extension
of Van der Aalst’s soundness property [2],
3. illustrate the approach with an order-to-cash (o2c) process.
We pick up the idea of incentive alignment for supply chains [4] and set out to apply
it in the realm of inter-organizational business processes. From a technical point of
view, we are interested in extending the model checking tools for cost analysis [9] for
bpmn process models to proper collaborations, very much like the model checker prism
has been extended from Markov decision processes to games [14]. Last but not least,
we put importance on the connection to established concepts from the business process
management community: not only do we keep the spirit of the soundness property; we
even obtain the rigorous result that incentive alignment is a conservative extension of the
soundness property.
1 https://www.ikiguide.com/ethereum/, accessed 8-3-2020
2 We shall use utility functions in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern [19].
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We introduce concepts and
notations in Section 2. On this basis, we formulate two versions of incentive alignment
in Section 3. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 4. The proof of the main theorem
can be found in Appendix A.
2 Game theoretic concepts and the Petri net tool chest
We now introduce the prerequisite concepts for stochastic games [24] and elementary
net systems [23]. The main benefit of using a game theoretic approach is a short list of
candidate definitions of equilibrium, which make precise the idea of a “good strategy”
for rational actors that compete as players of a game. We shall require the following two
properties of an equilibrium: (1) no player can benefit from unilateral deviation from the
“agreed” strategy and (2) players have the possibility to base their moves on information
from a single (trusted) mediator. The specific instance that we shall use are correlated
equilibria [3,10] as studied by Solan and Vieille [25].3 We take ample space to review
the latter two concepts, followed by a short summary of the background on Petri nets.
We use the following basic concepts and notation. The cardinality and the powerset of
a set M are denoted by |M| and ℘M, respectively. The set of real numbers is denoted by R
and [0, 1] ⊆ R is the unit interval. A probability distribution over a finite or countably
infinite set M is a function p : M → [0, 1] whose values are non-negative and sum up
to 1, in symbols
∑
m∈M p(m) = 1. The set of all probability distributions over a set M is
denoted by ∆(M).
2.1 Stochastic games, strategies, equilibria
We proceed by reviewing core concepts and central results for stochastic games [24],
introducing notation alongside; we shall use examples to illustrate the most important
concepts. The presentation is intended to be self-contained such that no additional
references should be necessary. However, the interested reader might want to consult
standard references or additional material, e.g., textbooks [15,21], handbook articles [11],
and surveys [26]. We start with the central notion.
Definition 1 (Stochastic game). A stochastic game G is a quintuple G = 〈N, S , A, q, u〉
that consists of
– a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , |N |} (ranged over by i, j, in, etc.);
– a finite set of states S (ranged over by s, s′, sn, etc.);
– a finite, non-empty set of action profiles A =
∏|N |
i=1 A
i (ranged over by a, an, etc.),
which is the Cartesian product of a player-indexed family {Ai }i∈N of sets Ai , each of
which contains the actions of the respective player (ranged over by ai , ain, etc.);
– a non-empty set of available actions Ai (s) ⊆ Ai , for each state s ∈ S and player i;
– probability distributions q(· | s, a) ∈ ∆(S ), for each state s ∈ S and every action
profile a ∈ A, which map each state s′ ∈ S to q(s′ | s, a), the transition probability
from state s to state s′ under the action profile a; and
3 Nash equilibria are a special case, which however have drawbacks that motivate Aumann’s
work on the more general correlated equilibria [3,10].
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Fig. 1. A an order-to-cash process
– the payoff vectors u(s, a) = 〈u1(s, a), . . . , u|N |(s, a)〉, for each state s ∈ S and every
action profile a = 〈a1, . . . , a|N |〉 ∈ A.
Note that players always have some action(s) available, possibly just a dedicated idle
action, see e.g. [13].
The bpmn model of Fig. 1 can be understood as (a partial specification of) a stochastic
game played by a shipper, a customer, and a supplier. Abstracting from data, precise
timings, and similar semantic aspects, a state of the game is a state of an instance of
the process, which is represented as a token marking of the bpmn model. The actions
of each player are the activities and events in the respective pool, e.g., the check stock
task, which Supplier performs upon receiving an order from Customer. Action profiles
are combinations of actions that can (or must) be executed concurrently. For example,
sending the order and receiving the order after the start of the collaboration may be
performed synchronously (e.g., via telephone). The available actions of a player in a
given state are the tasks or events in the respective pool that can be executed or happen
next – plus the possibility to idle. The transition probabilities for available actions in
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Fig. 2. Bob’s ideas about work life balance with Alice’s disapproval
this bpmn process are all 1, such that if players choose to execute certain tasks next, they
will be able to do so as long as the chosen activities are actually available actions. As a
consequence, all other transition probabilities are 0.
One important piece of information that is not explicitly specified in the bpmn model
is the utility (or payoff) of tasks and events. In general, it is non-trivial to chose utility
functions. However, the example is chosen such that there are natural candidates; e.g.,
postage can be looked up from one’s favorite carrier.
A single instance of the order-to-cash process exhibits the well-known phenomenon
that Customer has no incentive to pay. However, we want to stress that – very much for
the same reason! – Shipper would not have any good reason to perform delivery, once
the postage fee is paid. Thus, besides the single instance scenario, we shall consider an
unbounded number of repetitions of the process, but only one active process instance
at each point in time.4 Now, the rational reason for the shipper to deliver (and return
damaged goods) is expected revenue from future process instances.
One distinguishing feature of the order-to-cash collaboration is that participants do
not need to coordinate with each other in any non-trivial way; in particular, there are no
joint decisions to make. To illustrate the point, let us consider a different example. Alice
and Bob are co-founders of a company, which is running so smoothly that it suffices
when, any day of the week, only one of them is going to work. Depending on their mood,
at least one of them can spend their time with their favorite hobby.
Bob sketches a first plan to synchronize their schedules, depicted in Figure 2. How-
ever, Alice points out that this diagram is no good, among others because it mixes
data and event-based decisions. Alice remarks that this can be avoided by throwing a
coin in the morning, to decide who goes to work. But that leaves the question of who
should throw the coin and communicate the result. Alice suggests that their secretary
Mrs. Medina could help them out by rolling a 10-sided die each morning and notifying
them about who is going to go to work that day.
Alice comes up with the more elaborate process shown in Fig. 3, which lets Bob
and Alice work 60% and 40% of the days, resp., because Alice is 50% more efficient
than Bob. In fact, every point on the solid red line5 on the right in Fig. 3 correspond to a
4 We leave the very interesting situation of interleaved execution of several process instances for
future work.
5 The projections to the x-y, y-z, and x-z plane are rendered as dashed lines for clarity.
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Fig. 3. The To work or not to work? collaboration
choice of odds for going to work; the given bpmn model corresponds to the dot slightly
off the middle. The coordinates of each point describe the expected gain in personal
enjoyment and profits for the company, respectively. Thus, there is a choice of parameter
for any suitable work life balance. One might want to maximize for distance from the
origin, but questions of fairness can be addressed as well. However, Alice’s criterion for
choosing the odds is equal contribution of both co-founders to the company income.
In game theoretic terminology, Mrs. Medina is taking the role of a common source
of randomness that is independent of the state of the game and does not need to observe
the actions of the players. The specific formal notion that we shall use is that of an
autonomous correlation device [25, Definition 2.1].
Definition 2 (Autonomous correlation device). An autonomous correlation device is
a family of pairs D =
{
〈{Min}i∈N , dn〉
}
n∈N (that is indexed over natural numbers n ∈ N)
each of which consists of
– a family of finite sets of signals Min, (additionally) indexed over players; and
– a function dn that maps lists of signal vectors 〈x1, . . . , xn−1〉 ∈
∏n−1
k=1Mk to prob-
ability distributions dn〈x1, . . . , xn−1〉 ∈ ∆(Mn) over the Cartesian product Mn =∏|N |
i=1 M
i
n of all signal sets M
i
n.
We shall refer to operators of autonomous correlation devices as mediators, which guide
the actions of players during the game.
Each correlation device for a game induces an extended game, which proceeds
in stages. Concerning the example of Bob and Alice, Fig. 3 is a description of the
extended game of the collaboration that Bob drafted combined with the simplest possible
correlation device – assuming that each of the roles restarts at the end of the day.
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In general, given a game and an autonomous correlation device, the n-th stage
begins with the mediator drawing a signal vector xn ∈ Mn =
∏|N |
i=1 M
i
n according to the
device distribution dn〈x1, . . . , xn−1〉 – e.g., Mrs. Medina rolling the die – and sending the
components to the respective players – the sending of messages to Bob and Alice (in
one order or the other). Then, each player i chooses an available action ain. This choice
can be based on the respective component xin of the signal vector xn ∈ Mn, information
about previous states sk of the game G, and moves a
j
k of (other) players from the history.
6
After all players made their choice, we obtain an action profile an = 〈a1n, . . . , a|N |n 〉. The
reader may note, that the process model does not give Alive and Bob a lot of choice:
once Mrs. Medina sent them the message with the decision, they can only notify each
other (respectively receive this notification), and then work or surf / fish. However, in
our game setting they can also choose the “idle” action, e.g., instead of going to work.
While playing the extended game described above, each player makes observations
about the state and the actions of players; the role of the mediator is special insofar as
it does not need and is also not expected to observe the run of the game. The “local”
observations of each player are the basis of their strategies.
Definition 3 (Observation, strategy, strategy profile). For a natural number n ∈ N,
an observation at stage n by player i is a tuple h = 〈s1, xi1, a1, . . . , sn−1, xin−1, an−1, sn, xin〉
that consists of
– one state sk, signal xik, and action profile ak, for each number k < n,
– the current state sn, also denoted by sh, and
– the current signal xin.
The set of all observations is denoted by Hin(D). The union Hi(D) = ⋃n∈N Hin(D) of
observations at any stage is the set of observations of player i. A strategy is a map
σi : Hi(D) → ∆(Ai) from observations to probability distributions over actions that
are available at the current state of histories, i.e., σih(a
i) = 0 if ai < Ai(sh), for all
histories h ∈ Hi (D). A strategy profile is a player-indexed family of strategies {σi }i∈N .
Thus, each of the players observes the history of other players, including the possibility
of punishing other players for not heeding the advice of the mediator. This is possible
since signals might give (indirect) information concerning the (mis-)behavior of players
in the past, as remarked by Solan and Vieille [25, p. 370]: by revealing information about
proposed actions of previous rounds, players can check for themselves whether some
player has ignored some signal of the mediator.
The data of a game, a correlation device, and a strategy profile induce probabilities
for finite plays of the game, which in turn determine the expected utility of playing
the strategy. Formally, an autonomous correlation device and a strategy profile with
strategies for every player yield a probabilistic trajectory of a sequence of “global” states,
signal vectors of all players, and complete action profiles, dubbed history. The formal
details are as follows.
Definition 4 (History and its probability). Given a natural number n ∈ N, a history
at stage n is a tuple h = 〈s1, x1, a1, . . . , sn−1, xn−1, an−1, sn, xn〉 that consists of
6 In the present paper, we only consider games of perfect information, which is suitable for
business processes in a single organization or which are monitored on a blockchain.
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– one state sk, signal vector xk, and action profile ak, for each number k < n,
– the current state sn, often denoted by sh, and
– the current signal vector xn.
The set of all histories at state n is denoted by Hn(D). The union H(D) =
⋃
n∈N Hn(D)
of histories at arbitrary stages is the set of finite histories. The probability of a finite his-
tory7h = 〈s1, x1, a1, . . . , sn−1, xn−1, an−1, sn, xn〉 in the context of a correlation deviceD,
an initial state s, and a strategy profile σ is defined as follows, by recursion over the
length of histories.
n = 1: PD,s,σ(〈s1, x1〉) =
0 if s , s1d1〈〉(x1) otherwise
n > 1: PD,s,σ(〈~, an−1, sn, xn〉) = p〈~〉(an−1)︸     ︷︷     ︸∏
i∈N σ
i
〈~〉(a
i
n−1)
q(sn | sn−1, an−1) pdn−1 (xn)︸   ︷︷   ︸
dn−1〈x1,...,xn−1〉(xn)
Again, note that the autonomous correlation device does not “inspect” the states of a
history, in the sense that the distributions over signal vectors dn are not parameterized
over states from the history, but only over previously drawn signal vectors – whence the
name.
Definition 5 (Mean expected payoff). The mean expected payoff of player i for stage n
is γ¯in(D, s, σ) = ∑h∈Hn+1(D) PD,s ,σ(h)n ∑nk=1 ui (sk, ak) where h = 〈s1, x1, a1, . . . an, sn+1, xn+1〉.
At this point, we can address the question of what a good strategy profile is and fill
in all the details of the idea that an equilibrium is a strategy profile that does not give
players any good reason to deviate unilaterally. We shall tip our hats to game theory
and use the notation (pii , σ−i ) for the strategy profile which is obtained by “overwriting”
the single strategy σi of player i with a strategy pii (which might, but does not have
to be different); thus, the expression ‘(pii , σ−i)’ denotes the unique strategy subject to
equations (pii , σ−i )i = pii and (pii , σ−i ) j = σ j (for i , j).
Definition 6 (Autonomous correlated ε-equilibrium). Given a positive real ε > 0, an
autonomous correlated ε-equilibrium is a pair 〈D, σ∗〉, which consists of an autonomous
correlation deviceD and a strategy profile σ∗ for which there exists a natural number
n0 ∈ N such that for any alternative strategy σi of any player i,
γ¯in(D, s, σ∗) ≥ γ¯in
(
D, s, (σi , σ∗−i )
)
− ε (1)
Equation (1) holds, for all n ≥ n0 and all states s ∈ S .
Thus, a strategy is an autonomous correlated ε-equilibrium if the benefits that one might
reap in the long run by unilateral deviation from the strategy are negligible as ε can
be arbitrarily small. In fact, other players will have ways to punish deviation from the
equilibrium [25, § 3.2].
7 Note that these probabilities induce the probability measure on infinite histories from Solan and
Vieille [25]; thus, we extend the notation of op. cit. to finite histories.
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2.2 Petri nets and their operational semantics
Elementary net systems [23] are expressive enough for the purposes of the present paper;
however, for the sake of simplicity, we refer to them as Petri nets.8
Definition 7 (Petri net, marking, and marked Petri net). A Petri net is a tuple N =
(P,T , •(), ()•) that consists of
– a finite set of places P;
– a finite set of transitions T; and
– two functions •(), ()• : T → ℘P \ {∅} that assign to each transition t ∈ T its pre-set
•t ⊆ P and post-set t• ⊆ P, respectively, which are both required to be non-empty.
A marking of a Petri net N is a multiset of places m, i.e., a function m : P → N that
assigns to each place p ∈ P a non-negative integer m(p) ≥ 0. A marked Petri net is a
tuple N = (P,T , •(), ()•,m0) whose first four components (P,T , •(), ()•) are a Petri net
and whose last component m0 is the initial marking, which is a marking of the latter
Petri net.
One essential feature of Petri nets is the ability to execute several transitions concurrently
– possibly several occurrences of one and the same transition. However, we shall only
encounter situations in which a set of transitions fires. Again, for the sake of simplicity,
we shall use the general term step. We fix a Petri netN = (P,T , •(), ()•) for the remainder
of the section.
Definition 8 (Step, step transition, reachable marking). A step in the net N is a set
of transitions t ⊆ T. The transition relation of a step t ⊆ T relates a marking m to another
marking m′, in symbols m [t〉 m′, if the following two conditions are satisfied, for every
place p ∈ P.
1. m(p) ≥ |{t ∈ t | p ∈ •t}|
2. m′(p) = m(p) − |{t ∈ t | p ∈ •t}| + |{t ∈ t | p ∈ t•}|
We write m [〉 m′ if m [t〉 m′ holds for some step t and denote the reflexive transitive
closure of the relation [〉 by [〉∗. A marking m′ is reachable in a marked Petri net
N = (P,T , •(), ()•,m0) if m0 [〉∗ m′ holds (in the net (P,T , •(), ()•)).
For a single transition t ∈ T , we write m [t〉 m′ instead of m [{t}〉 m′. Note that the empty
step is always fireable, i.e., for each marking m, we have an “idle” step m [∅〉 m.
Recall that a marked Petri net N = (P,T , •(), ()•,m0) is safe if all reachable mark-
ings m′ have at most one token in any place, i.e., if they satisfy m′(p) ≤ 1, for all p ∈ P.
Thus, a marking m corresponds to a set mˆ ⊆ P satisfying p ∈ mˆ iff m(p) > 0; for
convenience, we shall identity a safe marking m with its set of places mˆ. The main
focus will be on Petri nets that are safe and extended free choice, i.e., if the pre-sets of
two transitions have a place in common, the pre-sets coincide. Finally, recall that the
conflict relation, denoted by #, relates two transitions if their pre-sets intersect, i.e., t # t′
if •t ∩ •t′ , ∅, for t, t′ ∈ T ; for extended free choice nets, the conflict relation is an
equivalence relation.
8 In fact, the results of the paper apply to the general case, mutatis mutandis. Also, note that we
leave the flow relation implicit as its identity is immaterial for the execution semantics.
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3 Incentive alignment
Soundness of business processes in the sense of Van der Aalst [2] implies termination if
transitions are governed by a strongly fair scheduler [1]:
If we assume a strong notion of fairness, then the first requirement implies that
eventually state [o] is reached. Strong fairness, sometimes also referred to as
“impartial” or “recurrent” [KA99], means that in every infinite firing sequence,
each transition fires infinitely often. Note that weaker notions of fairness are not
sufficient, see Figure 2 in [KA99].
Indeed, such a scheduler fits the intra-organizational setting. However, as discussed
for the order-to-cash process model, unfair scheduling practices could arise in the inter-
organizational setting if undesired behavior yields higher profits. We consider incentive
alignment to rule out scenarios that lure actors into counterproductive behavior. We
even can check whether all activities in a given bpmn model with utility annotations are
relevant and profitable.
As bpmn models have established Petri net semantics [6], it suffices to consider the
latter for the game theoretic aspects of incentive alignment. As a preparatory step, we
extend Petri nets with utility functions as pioneered by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [19]. Then we describe two ways to associate a stochastic game to a Petri net with
transition-based utilities: the first game retains the state space and the principal design
choice concerns transition probabilities; the second game is the restarting version of the
first game, which will turn out to be better suited to analyze business processes and even
gives rise to a tight connection with the soundness property of workflow nets [2]. Finally,
we define incentive alignment in full formal rigor based on stochastic games and show
that the soundness property for workflows nets can be “rediscovered” as a special case
of incentive alignment; in other words, soundness is conserved, and therefore incentive
alignment is a conservative extension of soundness.
3.1 Petri nets with utility and role annotations
We assume that costs (respectively profits) are incurred (resp. gained) per task and that,
in particular, utility functions do not depend on the state. Note that the game theoretic
results do not require this assumption; however, this assumption does not only avoid
clutter, but also retains the spirit of the abc method [12] and is in line with the work of
Herbert and Sharp [9].
Definition 9 (Petri net with transition payoffs and roles). For a set of roles R, a Petri
net with transition payoffs and roles is a triple (N , u, ρ) where
– N = (P,T , •(), ()•,m0) is a marked Petri net with initial marking m0,
– u : R → T → R is a utility function, and
– ρ : T ⇀ R is a partial function, assigning at most one role to each transition.
The utility ui(t) of a step t ⊆ T is the sum of the utilities of its elements, i.e., ui(t) =∑
t∈t ui (t), for each role i ∈ R.
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Fig. 4. Extending Petri nets with role and utility annotations
As a consequence of the definition, the idle step has zero utility. We have included the
possibility that some of the transitions are not controlled by any of the roles (of a bpmn
model) by using a partial function from transitions to roles; we take a leaf out of the
game theorist’s book and attribute the missing role to nature.
Fig. 4 displays a Petri net on the left. The names of the places p1, . . . , p4 will be
convenient later. In the same figure on the right, we have added annotations that carry
information concerning roles, costs, and profits in the form of lists of role-utility pairs
next to transitions. E.g., the transition t0 is assigned to role a and firing t0 results in
utility −1 for a, i.e., one unit of cost. The first role in each list denotes responsibility
for the transition and we have omitted entries with zero utility. We also have colored
transitions with the same color as the role assigned to it.
There are natural translations from bpmn models with payoff annotations for activities
to Petri nets with payoffs and roles (relative to any of the established Petri net semantics
for models in bpmn [6]). If pools are used, we take one role per pool and each task is
assigned to its enclosing pool; for pairs of sending and receiving tasks or events, the
sender is responsible for the transition to be taken. The only subtle point concerns the role
of nature. When should we blame nature for the data on which choices are based? The
answer depends on the application at hand. For instance, let us consider the order-to-cash
model of Fig. 1: whether or not the supplier is out of stock is only partially within the
control of supplier; also, we can avoid the need to meticulously model all factors that
might lead to damage of a shipped good by blaming nature. In a first approximation, we
simply let nature determine the state of the stock and damage goods at will.
3.2 Single process instances and the base game with fair conflicts
We now describe how each Petri net with transition payoffs and roles gives rise to a
stochastic game, based on two design choices: each role can execute only one (enabled)
transition at a time and conflicts are resolved in a probabilistically fair manner. For
example, for the net on the right in Fig. 4, we take four states p0, p1, p2, p3, one for each
reachable marking. The Petri net does not prescribe what should happen if roles a and c
both try to fire transitions t1 and t′ simultaneously if the game is in state p2. The simplest
probabilistically fair solution consists of flipping a coin; depending on the outcome, the
game continues in state p1 or in state p3. For the general case, let us fix a safe, extended
free-choice net (N , u, ρ) with payoffs and roles whose initial marking is m0.
Definition 10 (The base game with fair conflicts). Let X ⊆ ℘T be the partitioning
of the set of transitions into equivalence classes of the conflict relation on the set of
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transitions, i.e., X = {{t′ ∈ T | t′ # t} | t ∈ T}; its members are called conflict sets. Given
a safe marking m ⊆ P and a step t ⊆ T, a maximal m-enabled sub-step is a step t′ that
is enabled at the marking m, is contained in the step t, and contains one transition of
each conflict set that has a non-empty intersection with the step, i.e., such that all three
of m [t′〉, t′ ⊆ t and |t′| = |{X ∈ X | t ∩ X , ∅}| hold. We write t′ vm t if the step t′ is a
maximal m-enabled sub-step of the step t.
The base game with fair conflicts 〈N, S , A, q, u〉 of the net (N , u, ρ) is defined as
follows.
– The set of players N := R ∪ {⊥} is the set of roles and nature, ⊥ < R.
– The state space S is the set of reachable markings, i.e., S = {m′ | m0 [〉∗ m′}.
– The action set of an individual player i is Ai := {∅} ∪ {{t} | t ∈ T , ρ(t) = i}, which
consists of the empty set and possibly singletons of transitions, where ρ(t) = ⊥ if
ρ(t) is not defined. We identify an action profile a ∈ A = ∏|N |i=1 Ai with the union of
its components a ≡ ⋃i∈N ai .
– In a given state m, the available actions of player i are the enabled transitions, i.e.,
Ai (m) = {{t} ∈ Ai | m [t〉}.
– q(m′ | m, t) = ∑t′vm t s.t. m[t′〉m′ ∏X∈X s.t. t∩X,∅ 1|t∩X|
– ui (m, t) =
∑
t∈t ui (t) if i ∈ R and u⊥(m, t) = 0, for all t ⊆ T, and m ⊆ P.
Let us summarize the stochastic game of a given Petri net with transition payoffs and
roles. The stochastic game has the same state space as the Petri net, i.e., the set of
reachable markings. The available actions for each player at a given marking are the
enabled transitions that are assigned to the player, plus the “idle” step. Each step comes
with a state-independent payoff, which sums up the utilities of each single transition, for
each player i. In particular, if all players chose to idle, the corresponding action profile is
the empty step ∅, which gives 0 payoff. The transition probabilities implement the idea
that all transitions of an action profile get a fair chance to fire, even if the step contains
conflicting transitions. Let us highlight the following two points for a fixed marking
and step: (1) given a maximal enabled sub-step, we roll a fair “die” for each conflict set
where the “die” has one “side” for each transition in the conflict set that also belongs
to the sub-step (unless the “die” has zero sides); (2) there might be several choices of
maximal enabled sub-steps that lead to the same marking. In the definition of transition
probabilities, the second point is captured by summation over maximal enabled sub-steps
of the step and the first point corresponds to a product of probabilities for each outcome
of “rolling” one of the “dice”.
We want to emphasize that if additional information about transition probabilities
are known, it should be incorporated. In a similar vein, one can adapt the approach of
Herbert and Sharp [9], which extends the bpmn language with probability annotations for
choices. However, as we are mainly interested in a priori analysis, our approach might
be preferable since it avoids arbitrary parameter guessing. The most important design
choice that we have made concerns the role of nature, which we consider as absolutely
neutral; it is not even concerned with progress of the system as it does not benefit from
transitions being fired.
Now, let us consider once more the order-to-cash process. If the process reaches the
state in which customer’s next step is payment, there is no incentive for paying. Instead,
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Fig. 5. Restarting process example
customer can choose to idle, ad infinitum. In fact, this strategy yields maximum payoff
for the customer. The bpmn-model does not give any means for punishing customer’s
payment inertia. However, there is not even any incentive for shipper to pick up the
goods! Incentives in the single instance scenario can be fixed, e.g., by adding escrow.
However, in the present paper, we shall give yet a different perspective: we repeat the
process indefinitely.
3.3 Restarting the game for multiple process instances
The single instance game from Definition 10 has one major drawback. It allows to
analyze only a single instance of a business process. We shall now consider a variation
of the stochastic game, which addresses the case of multiple instances in the simplest
form. The idea is the same as the one for looping versions of workflow nets that have
been considered in the literature, e.g., to relate soundness with liveness [1, Lemma 5.1]:
we simply restart the game in the initial state whenever we reach a final marking.
Definition 11 (Restart game). A safe marking m ⊆ P is final if it does not intersect
with any pre-set, i.e., if m ∩ •t = ∅, for all transitions t ∈ T; we write m ↓ if the
marking m is final, and m 6 ↓ if not. Let 〈N, S , A, q, u〉 be the base game with fair conflicts
of the net (N , u, ρ). The restart game of the net (N , u, ρ) is the game 〈N, S˚ , A˚, q˚, u〉 with
– S˚ = S \ {m′′ ⊆ P | m′′ ↓};
– q˚(m′ | m, t) =
q(m′ | m, t) if m′ , m0q(m0 | m, t) + ∑m′′↓ q(m′′ | m, t) if m′ = m0
for all m,m′ ∈ S˚ ; and the available actions restricted to S˚ ⊆ S , i.e., A˚i(s) = Ai(s), for
s ∈ S˚ .
For workflow nets, the variation amounts to identifying the final place with the initial
place. The passage to the restart game is illustrated in Fig. 5. Note that the restart game
of our example is drastically different. Player c will be better off “cooperating” and never
choosing the action t′, but instead idly reaping benefits by letting players a and b do the
work.
3.4 Incentive alignment w.r.t. proper completion and full liveness
We now formalize the idea that participants want to expect benefits from taking part in
a collaboration if agents behave rationally – the standard assumption of game theory.
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The proposed definition of incentive alignment is in principle of qualitative nature, but it
hinges on quantitative information, namely the expected utility for each of the business
partners of an interorganizational process.
Let us consider a Petri net with payoffs (N , u, ρ), e.g., the Petri net semantics of a
bpmn model. Incentive alignment amounts to existence of equilibrium strategies in the
associated restart game 〈N, S˚ , A˚, q˚, u〉 (as per Definition 11) that eventually will lead to
positive utility for every participating player. The full details are as follows.
Definition 12 (Incentive alignment w.r.t. completion and full liveness). Given an
autonomous correlation deviceD, a correlated strategy profile σ is eventually positive
if there exists a natural number n¯ ∈ N such that, for all larger natural numbers n > n¯,
the expected payoff of every player is positive, i.e., for all i ∈ N, γ¯in(D,m0, σ) > 0.
Incentives in the net (N , u, ρ) are aligned with
– proper completion if, for every positive real ε > 0, there exist an autonomous
correlation deviceD and an eventually positive correlated ε-equilibrium strategy
profile σ of the restart game 〈N, S˚ , A˚, q˚, u〉 such that, for every natural number n¯ ∈ N,
there exists a history h ∈ Hn(D) at stage n > n¯ with current state sh = m0 that has
non-zero probability, i.e., PD,m0,σ(h) > 0;
– full liveness if, for every positive real ε > 0, there exist an autonomous correlation
device D and an eventually positive correlated ε-equilibrium strategy profile σ
of the restart game 〈N, S˚ , A˚, q˚, u〉 such that, for every transition t ∈ T, for every
reachable marking m′, and for every natural number n¯ ∈ N, there exists a history
h = 〈m′, x1, a1, . . . , sn−1, xn−1, an−1, sn, xn〉 ∈ Hn(D)
at stage n > n¯ with t ∈ an−1 and PD,m′,σ(h) > 0.
Both variations of incentive alignment ensure that all participants can expect to gain
profits on average, eventually; moreover, something “good” will always be possible in
the future where something “good” is either restart of the game (upon completion) or
additional occurrences of every transition.
There are several interesting consequences. First, incentive alignment w.r.t. full
liveness implies incentive alignment w.r.t. proper completion, for the case of safe conflict-
free Petri nets where the initial marking is only reachable via the empty transition
sequence, including the following class of workflow nets.
Definition 13 (Elementary workflow net). An elementary workflow net is an elemen-
tary net system N = (P,T , •(), ()•) [23] such that
– there exist unique places i ∈ P and o ∈ P, such that i < t• and o < •t, for all t ∈ T,
which are called the initial and final place, resp., and
– each place is in the pre- or post-set of some transition, i.e., P =
⋃
t∈T (•t ∪ t•).
Next, note that incentive alignment w.r.t. full liveness implies the soundness property for
safe elementary workflow nets. The main insight is that correlated equilibria can serve
a very special case of strongly fair schedulers, not only for the case of a single player.
However, we can even obtain a characterization of soundness in terms of incentive
alignment w.r.t. full liveness, which makes precise in which sense we have extended
soundness conservatively.
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Theorem 1 (Characterization of soundness). Let N be a elementary workflow net
that is safe and extended free choice; let (N , ρ : T → {Σ}, 1) be the net with transition
payoffs and roles where Σ is a unique role, ρ : T → {Σ} is the unique total function, and
1 is the constant utility-1 function. The soundness property holds in N if, and only if,
incentives in (N , ρ : T → {Σ}, 1) are aligned w.r.t. full liveness.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Finally, the reader may wonder why we consider the restarting game. Indeed, for
Petri nets that do not have any cycles, one could formalize the idea of incentive alignment
using finite extensive form games for which correlated equilibria have been studied as
well [27]. However, this alternative approach is only natural for Petri nets with transition
payoffs and roles, but without cycles. In the present paper we have opted for a general
approach, which does not impose the rather strong restriction on nets to be acyclic. Also
let us emphasize that the restart games are merely a means to an end. We generate them
from arbitrary free-choice safe Petri nets with transition payoffs and roles, which are the
main objects of the theoretical result.
4 Conclusions and future work
We have described a game theoretic perspective on incentive alignment of inter-organiza-
tional business processes. It applies to bpmn collaboration models that have annotations
for activity-based utilities for all roles. The main theoretical result is that incentive
alignment is a conservative extension of the soundness property, which means that
we have described a uniform framework that applies the same principles to intra- and
inter-organizational business processes. We have illustrated incentive alignment for
the example of the order-to-cash process and an additional example that is tailored to
illustrate the game theoretic element of mediators.
The natural next step is the implementation of a tool chain that takes a bpmn collabo-
ration model with annotations, transforms it into a Petri net with transition payoffs and
roles, which in turn is analyzed concerning incentive alignment, e.g., using algorithms
for solving stochastic games [17]. One might even consider to extend prism [14] or the
model checker storm [8]. A very challenging venue for future theoretical work is the
extension to the analysis of interleaved execution of several instances of a process.
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A The conservative extension theorem
Let us quickly recall the definition of soundness. According to [1]9, an (elementary)
workflow net is
sound if and only if the following three requirements are satisfied: (1) option to
complete: for each case it is always still possible to reach the state which just
marks place end, (2) proper completion: if place end is marked all other places
are empty for a given case, and (3) no dead transitions: it should be possible to
execute an arbitrary activity by following the appropriate route
where each case means each reachable marking, state means marking, marked means
marked by a reachable marking, activity means transition, and following the appropriate
route means after executing the appropriate firing sequence (see also [1, Definition 5.1]).
Lemma 1 (Proper completion from safety and option to complete). If an elementary
workflow net is safe, the option to complete implies proper completion.
Proof. Let m′ be a reachable marking that covers the final place, i.e., o ∈ m′. The
existence of an option to complete implies that there is a firing sequence from the
marking m′ to the final marking, i.e., a firing sequence of the form.
m′ [t1〉 m1 [t2〉 · · ·mn [tn〉 [o]
If this firing sequence is empty, i.e., if n = 0, we obtain the desired, because then we have
already started from the final marking, i.e., m′ = [o]. It remains to show that, for every
reachable marking m′ that covers o, there cannot be any (non-empty) firing sequence
m′ [t1〉 m1 [t2〉 · · ·mn [tn〉 [o]
of length n ≥ 1.We shall proceed by induction on n ≥ 1.
n = 1 Let m′ be a reachable marking such that o ∈ m′ and assume that m′ [t1〉 [o] (to
derive a contradiction). Because the net is an elementary net system, the transition t1
consumes a token from the marking m′ and produces a token in the final place.
However this would mean that the net is not safe as the marking m′ covers the final
place already and t1 cannot consume a token from the final place, by the definition of
elementary workflow net. This however leads to a contradiction to the assumption of
safety. Hence, there cannot be a firing sequence of length one from the marking m′
to the final marking.
n { n + 1 The induction hypothesis is that, for every reachable marking m′ with o ∈ m′,
there cannot be any firing sequence
m′ [t1〉 m1 [t2〉 · · ·mn [tn〉 [o]
of length n ≥ 1 to the final marking. Let m′′ be a reachable marking that such
that o ∈ m′′ and assume that there exists a firing sequence
m′′ [t′1〉 m′1 [t′2〉 · · ·m′n+1 [t′n+1〉 [o]
9 Emphasis is taken from the source.
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(to derive a contradiction). Note that m′1 still covers the final place (as o <
•t′1) and is
reachable. This however leads to a contradiction to the induction hypothesis, which
states that there cannot by any firing sequence of the form
m′1 [t
′
2〉 · · ·m′n+1 [t′n+1〉 [o]
with m′1 reachable and covering the final place. Thus, we have derived a contradic-
tion.
Finally, by the principle of complete induction, there cannot be any firing sequence
m′ [t1〉 m1 [t2〉 · · ·mn [tn〉 [o]
of length n for n > 0. Hence n = 0 is the only relevant case, which we have already
covered, and thus the proof is complete. uunionsq
We now provide the proof of Theorem 1. To avoid clutter, we denote the restart game
by 〈N, S , A, q, u〉.
Theorem 1 (Characterization of soundness). LetN be a elementary workflow net that
is safe and extended free choice; let (N , ρ : T → {Σ}, 1) be the net with transition payoffs
and roles where Σ is a unique role, ρ : T → {Σ} is the unique total function, and 1 is the
constant utility-1 function. The soundness property holds in N if, and only if, incentives
in (N , ρ : T → {Σ}, 1) are aligned w.r.t. full liveness.
Proof. Let N be an elementary workflow net that is safe and extended free-choice with
initial marking [i]. This implies that the set of transitions is non-empty, because the final
place has to be an element of some post-set, by definition.
First, assume that the net (N , u, ρ) with initial marking [i] is incentive aligned
w.r.t. full liveness. By definition of the latter, for some specific choice of ε > 0 (e.g.,
ε = 0.5), there exists an eventually positive, correlated ε-equilibrium σ of the restart
game 〈N, S , A, q, u〉 such that, for every transition t ∈ T , every reachable marking m′,
and for every natural number n¯ ∈ N, there exists a history
h = 〈m′, x1, a1, . . . , sn−1, xn−1, an−1, sn, xn〉 ∈ Hn(D) (2)
at stage n > n¯ with an−1 = {t} (using that there are no parallel steps allowed in the restart
game, and there is only one role) and PD,m′,σ(h) > 0.
We first address the non-existence of dead transitions. Let t ∈ T be a transition.
We have to show that t it is not dead. i.e., will eventually be fired. Now, m0 = [i] is a
reachable marking and 1 is a natural number. Hence, by the above property of σ, there
exists a history
h = 〈m0, x1, a1, . . . , sn−1, xn−1, an−1, sn, xn〉 ∈ Hn(D) (3)
at stage n > 0 with with an−1 = {t} and PD,m0,σ(h) > 0. Let k < n be the largest index
such that sk = m0. Thus, in the Petri net N , there is a firing sequence
[i] = m0 = sk [ak〉 · · · sn−1 [an−1〉 sn
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such that an−1 = {t}; hence, sn−1 [t〉 and sn−1 is reachable. As the transition t was arbitrary,
incentive alignment w.r.t. full liveness implies that there are no dead transitions.
Concerning the option to complete, let m′ be an arbitrary reachable marking. For
the option to complete, we want to show that there exists a firing sequence
m′ [t1〉 · · ·mn [tn〉 [o]
from the reachable marking m′ to the final marking [o]. First, note that we can assume
w.l.o.g. that m′ , [o] (as otherwise the empty firing sequence suffices). Hence, we only
need to consider the case in which m′ , [o]. We proceed by choosing a transition t0 ∈ T
that is enabled at the initial marking, i.e., [i] [t0〉; such a transition must exist since the
net N is an elementary net system. Also, 2 is a natural number. Hence, by the above
property of σ, there exists a history
h = 〈m′, x1, a1, . . . , sn−1, xn−1, an−1, sn, xn〉 ∈ Hn(D) (4)
at stage n > 2 with an−1 = {t0} and PD,m′,σ(h) > 0. Hence, sn−1 = m0 = [i], because
the net is an elementary workflow net and •t0 = [i] = m0. Thus, there exists a smallest
index ` > 1 such that s` = m0 = [i]. Hence, there is a non-empty firing sequence
m′ [a1〉 · · · s`−1 [a`−1〉 [o]
in the Petri net N , by definition of the restart game and because [o] is the only final
marking. Thus, we have shown that options to complete exist. Proper completion follows
by Lemma 1.
Conversely, assume that the net N satisfies the soundness property. We choose a
correlation deviceD that gives the same signal (no matter the history). Thus, MΣn = {>}
where > is an arbitrary unique signal and the probability distributions dn〈x1, . . . , xn−1〉
concentrate all probability mass on the unique signal x = 〈>〉.
First, note that if player Σ always chooses some transition as action, or, equivalently,
never chooses to idle, we obtain a strategy profile for the correlation device, which is
an eventually positive ε-equilibrium strategy profile.10 Here, we use the fact that the
restart game allows the player to execute at most one transition at a time. Now, relying
on the option to complete, we shall construct a strategy σ that only considers the current
state; such strategies are called stationary. Thus, let σ be the strategy of player Σ that
chooses, uniformly at random, one of the transitions that are enabled at the current state.
More formally, if we put Lm = {t ∈ T | m [t〉}, for any reachable marking m, then σ is
characterized by the equation
σΣh {t} =
 1Lsh if sh [t〉0 otherwise,
for every observation h.
Now, we claim that the strategy σ yields a “uniform” witness for incentive alignment
w.r.t. full liveness, i.e., that for every ε > 0, the strategy profile 〈σ〉 is an eventually
10 These strategies are the best ones existing or dominant, in game theoretic vernacular.
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positive correlated ε-equilibrium such that, for all transitions t ∈ T , every reachable
marking m′, and each natural number n¯ ∈ N, there exists a history
h = 〈m′, x1, a1, . . . , sn−1, xn−1, an−1, sn, xn〉 ∈ Hn(D)
at stage n > n¯ with t ∈ an−1 and PD,m′,σ(h) > 0.
Thus, let ε > 0 be a positive real, let t ∈ T be a transition, let m′ be a reachable
marking, and let n¯ ∈ N be a natural number. We first show that there exist
1. a history h′ that starts from m′ and leads to [i],
2. a history h′′ that starts from [i], also leads to [i], and is non-empty, and
3. a history h′′′ that starts from [i] and leads to a marking that enables the transition t
and all these histories are “possible”, i.e., PD,m′,σ(h′) > 0, PD,[i],σ(h′′) > 0, and
PD,[i],σ(h′′′) > 0.
Back to the initial marking By construction of σ, using the option to complete and
Lemma 1, there is a history h′ of the form
h′ = 〈m′, x′1, a′1, . . . , sk−1′, x′k−1, a′k−1, sk′, x′k〉 ∈ Hk(D)
with PD,m′,σ(h′) > 0 such that sk′ = [i], sl′ , [i] for all l < k, and k > 0.
Looping on the initial marking There is an initial transition t0, i.e., one such that •t0 = [i];
let m′′ be the marking reached after firing t0, i.e., [i] [t0〉 m′′. Now, by the same argument
as for h′, we obtain a history h′′ of the form
h′′ = 〈m′′, x′′1 , a′′1 , . . . , sr−1′′, x′′r−1, a′′r−1, sr′′, x′′r 〉 ∈ Hr(D)
with PD,m′′,σ(h′′) > 0 such that sr′′ = [i], s j′′ , [i] for all j < r, and r > 0.
Reaching the transition Finally, by construction of σ, and using the absence of dead
transitions, there is a history h′′′ of the form
h′′′ = 〈m′′′, x′′′1 , a′′′1 , . . . , sn−1′′′, x′′′n′−1, a′′′n′−1, sn′ ′′′, x′′′n′ 〉 ∈ Hn′ (D)
with PD,m′′′,σ(h′′′) > 0 such that {t} = a′′′n′−1.
Putting histories together Finally, as the strategy σ is stationary, i.e., it does not dis-
tinguish between histories with the same current state, we can concatenate h′, enough
copies of h′′, and the third history h′′′ to obtain a history h as desired.
As σ always chooses some transition to execute next, it is a dominant strategy and
thus in particular an ε-equilibrium; moreover, it is eventually positive since it reaches
average utility of 1. uunionsq
